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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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PART I**OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST****EAST-WEST RELATIONS**

Moscow, seeking to keep its own Berlin proposals in the public eye while Western leaders are drafting and concerting positions for the summit talks in May, on 19 February made public a memorandum sent to the West German Social Democratic party (SPD) on 13 January. Using statements by West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt as the pretext for clarifying the Soviet position, the memorandum sets out in detail the Soviet proposal to sign a German peace treaty and transform West Berlin into a free city.

The memo appears designed to re-emphasize for the West the possible "consequences" of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany and to enhance the attractiveness of an interim Berlin solution as an alternative. It warns that the Soviet Union would proceed with a separate treaty "should it prove impossible" to settle the issue by negotiations, and that such action would be irrevocable.

The memorandum points out that the access routes to Berlin would come under the "full sovereignty" of East Germany, and that "any uncontrolled communications" between West Berlin and West Germany would cease. The Soviet Union, it says, would carry out its commitments to the East Germans as an ally and provide "all necessary support" to defend East German "sovereignty."

This blunt language is offset by a number of hints of

flexibility. Although adhering to the basic formula for a free city, the memo suggests Moscow's willingness to consider counter-proposals which could lead to a solution more acceptable to the West. In an attempt to exploit Mayor Brandt's numerous statements that the economic ties between Bonn and Berlin were as important as the political bonds, the memo acknowledges that "in practice, West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic will be closer than with any other country."

While warning that conclusion of a separate treaty would leave the West to deal directly with the East German regime, the memo also notes that a modus vivendi might be found to overcome the "difficulties" which might result from the Western powers' lack of relations with the East Germans.

The memo also states that the establishment of a free city might be approached by stages. This presumably refers to the proposals advanced by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 10 June at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference when he offered to agree to a provisional status for West Berlin for a specified time period on condition that the two German states establish an all-German committee to discuss a peace treaty.

Moscow probably hoped that the delivery of the memo on 13 January would drive a wedge between Mayor Brandt and his SPD colleagues, and that

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this pressure, coupled with an implied offer to consider counterproposals, would compel the SPD to take a more flexible public stand. The display of interparty unity during the 10 February Bundestag debate on foreign policy probably prompted Moscow to try to underscore publicly the consequences of Western refusal to consider the Soviet proposals.

As in the memo, an Izvestia article on 18 February presents the free-city concept as a concession, claiming that the occupation of West Berlin is outdated and "contrary to international law." The article asserts Berlin is legally part of East Germany and should be made such on a de facto basis; but that the USSR has offered to create a free city in an effort to meet the Western powers' refusal to act "as required" by international law.

Bloc View of President's Trip

Peiping and Moscow are giving President Eisenhower's Latin American visit the same divergent propaganda treatment accorded his December trip to Asia. The Chinese are openly hostile. People's Daily on 23 February bitterly charged that the United States is a "savage aggressor" and that President Eisenhower "is no friend of the Latin American people." Blaming him for the overthrow of the "democratic" government of Guatemala in 1954, the paper warned that "American imperialism" is increasing its intervention in Havana in order to subvert the Cuban revolution and impede the anti-US struggle in Latin America.

Moscow has given the trip relatively factual coverage, but has used excerpts from the foreign press to imply that the tour is intended to "soften the anti-American sentiment" in the area. A domestic broadcast on 22 February reported the President's television broadcast and quoted him on the purposes of the trip. This was offset by comments purportedly taken from a Senate report on Latin America which Moscow claims is critical of US policy, which is motivated by "egoism" and the "desire to increase profits." The American press is quoted as claiming that the President is not taking "any concrete proposals" which would help Latin Americans.

Nuclear Test Ban Talks

The Soviet delegation at Geneva has maintained its strong stand against a limited nuclear test ban treaty. Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin told Ambassador Wadsworth privately on

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17 February that nothing less than total test suspension would be agreeable to Moscow. At the same time, he assured the American chief delegate that the USSR would not be the first to break off the conference, "no matter how dim the prospects" for agreement.

In an effort to support the Soviet contention that small underground tests cannot be separated from other testing, Tsarapkin warned that, if the United States resumed its program, the USSR would follow with "testing in every environment it chose." This probably was intended primarily as a warning that if the United States resumes testing, no matter how limited the basis, it will bear the onus for the resumption by the USSR of its testing program, which might include even atmospheric experiments. Despite his assurance to Wadsworth, Tsarapkin's threat was probably also meant to raise the possibility that a resumption of testing could lead to a termination of the negotiations.

The Soviet delegate indicated that Moscow might be willing to go beyond a provision of its 16 February proposal--based on a suggestion by the

British delegate in January--for joint research to develop agreement on precisely what instrument readings would give any party to the treaty the right to insist on an immediate on-site inspection. The Soviet leaders may plan to expand their proposal to include Western suggestions for joint experimentation to improve methods and instrumentation for detecting underground explosions. Thus far, Moscow has repeatedly rejected the possibility of including supervised underground nuclear explosions in any research program.

In the plenary sessions, the Soviet delegate has continued to avoid committing the USSR to an exact number of annual on-site inspections, asserting that the West must first agree in principle to the 16 February Soviet plan which tied acceptance of "temporary" standards for sending out inspection teams to Western acceptance of Khrushchev's proposal for a fixed number of such inspections each year. He also refused to set forth Moscow's position on the course of action to be taken should the proposed two- to three-year period for research and development fail to produce agreement on improved criteria for sending out inspection teams.

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MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS**UAR-Israel**

Egyptian troop movements late last week into the Sinai

Peninsula raised total UAR strength there to about 34,000 men, including the entire Fourth Armored Division.

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Despite Cairo's fears, there is still no evidence indicating Israeli preparations for large-scale action.

UAR anxiety may also be attributable to reports of impending trouble in Iraq, possibly requiring UAR involvement. A coup against Qasim, with Cairo's intervention, would probably draw a reaction from Israel, and the UAR troop movements may be designed to meet such a contingency.

Nasir in Syria

The Israeli border "crisis" has conveniently provided material for Nasir's speeches in Syria, where he has made a barnstorming effort to whip up the Syrians' lagging enthusiasm for their union with Egypt. Along with the Israeli threat, Nasir has castigated Communism, imperialism, and Qasim as "enemies of Arab nationalism," working and waiting for an end to the union.

Soviet officials, who had expressed satisfaction with Soviet-UAR relations following conclusion of the Aswan High Dam contract last month, now are probably miffed that Nasir's anti-Communism has not been inhibited by the agreement.

Throughout his sojourn, which began on 14 February, Nasir has repeatedly attacked Qasim, usually in the banter of which he is a master. Crowd response reportedly has been enthusiastic. Although the lasting effect of his campaign to inoculate the Syrians against Qasim cannot be

measured, Nasir has probably done much to undercut Iraqi propaganda efforts to stir up Syrian resentment against his regime.

During Nasir's tour of Syria, the Baghdad radio and press have attacked him for "one-man rule" and for being an enemy of free political life, as well as for betraying the cause of the Palestinian refugees. Nasir also is charged with looking at Iraq's oil riches with covetous eyes and with creating a "forged socialism" in Egypt. Qasim is portrayed by Baghdad radio as aspiring to become the savior of the Nasir-oppressed Syrian people.

Iraq

Following Qasim's dismissal of pro-Communist Minister of Agrarian Reform Ibrahim Kubba last week, Qasim has delivered two telling blows to the aspirations of the Moscow-favored Iraqi Communists. The first of these was on 23 February when, in a speech to the Communist-dominated Iraqi Teachers' Association, Qasim abruptly announced the abolition of the "Iraqi Partisans of Peace," an affiliate of the Communist-run World Peace Council. The Peace Partisans have a long history as Iraq's principal Communist front.

The next day the "orthodox" Communists' second application for political status was refused on grounds that the Qasim-backed splinter group, led by Daud Sayigh,

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which was legalized on 10 February as the "Communist Party of Iraq," sufficiently represented the Communist viewpoint. While this group may technically appeal its case to the courts, in reality it has little choice but to go underground, unless it is able to find an outlet for legal political activity through a front party. Its members might attempt to infiltrate and take over the Sayigh group.

The abolition of the Peace Partisans is a severe blow to the Communists, since as late as last summer the Qasim regime provided them with funds and supported their demonstrations. A demonstration by this group in Mosul last spring sparked the revolt there by anti-Qasim and anti-Communist army elements.

Military Governor Abdi informed an American official on 18 February following the dismissal of the pro-Communist minister of agrarian reform that two more cabinet members may be dropped. Likely candidates are Minister of Planning and Acting Minister of Oil Affairs Shaybani, an extreme leftist, and the female Minister of Municipalities Nadia Dulaymi, a leader of the Peace Partisans.

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ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FALLS

The resignation of Italian Premier Segni on 24 February increases the pressure on the Christian Democratic party to decide whether to form a rightist government with neo-Fascists and Monarchists, as was formed in Sicily on 23 February, or a center-left government with Nenni Socialist support, as urged by left-wing Christian Democrats. Another stopgap minority government could result, and, in any case, negotiations will probably be protracted.

With the withdrawal of Liberal party support from his all-Christian Democratic cab-

inet, Segni decided to resign rather than face nationwide spring elections while relying for support solely on the parties of the extreme right--the neo-Fascists and Monarchists. Liberal party leaders attributed their action to reluctance of their predominantly conservative followers to continue parliamentary support--without any representation in the cabinet--of a government "dominated by a desire" to collaborate with the Nenni Socialists. They objected also to certain pending legislation and to the initiative which the Christian Democrats have permitted President Gronchi regarding foreign policy.

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
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The recent formation of a Sicilian government of Christian Democrats and rightists, including neo-Fascists, bears on the national crisis. The national Christian Democratic directorate implicitly approved the new coalition, reversing the position it had taken in the fall, when it urged Sicilian Christian Democrats to form a government with the Nenni Socialists in order to isolate the Communists. The Communists were exploiting their association with the Milazzo government to build up their grass-roots strength.

or abstention to accomplish needed reforms and undercut the Communists.

The Nenni Socialists, followed by the Communists, have offered to support a government free from rightist associations.

The Christian Democratic right wing fears such a govern-



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The left-wing Christian Democrats, along with the Republicans and Social Democrats, oppose any application of the new rightist Sicilian formula at the national level. They believe it would raise the danger of an authoritarian cabinet under strong Fascist influence, which in turn would lead to a Communist voice in parliament as center-left forces react by moving toward the far left. They refuse to revive the old center coalition including Democratic Socialists, Republicans, and Liberals, believing that the only viable government would have to include Social Democrats and Republicans and depend on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support

ment would accomplish domestic reforms they oppose. They assert that it would also weaken Italy's pro-Western foreign policy. Rightist leaders may feel that disunity in the Christian Democratic left would make opportune formation of a Nenni-supported government which would quickly founder and be followed by a more rightist formula.

Meanwhile, if the crisis is protracted, pressure will develop for postponement of the local elections, which the right would like to delay. National elections, not due until 1963, might be advanced, but hardly to any date earlier than the spring of 1961.

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PART II**NOTES AND COMMENTS****KHRUSHCHEV IN INDONESIA**

Khrushchev's public reception during his Indonesian tour has not been markedly enthusiastic except in Jogjakarta, where university students wildly applauded him, and in the Communist stronghold of Surabaya, where he addressed an enthusiastic mass rally. Elsewhere, despite the fact that the government and business employees had been dismissed to assure a large turnout, only medium-sized crowds greeted him, and, in the American Embassy's opinion, it is doubtful whether the populace is very interested.

Khrushchev has been somewhat irritable, as he was in India and in Burma. He has been less adroit than usual, with some of his statements and actions bordering on rudeness. His casual habits, his lateness for appointments, and his disregard for the usual diplomatic amenities have irritated President Sukarno.

Khrushchev's invidious comparison of Indonesian natural rubber with Soviet-produced synthetic rubber obviously nettled Sukarno. Khrushchev belittled the artistic merits of Indonesian handicrafts being offered him by Sukarno. While Sukarno's two daughters were dancing for Khrushchev at a dinner in the palace, Khrushchev turned aside to an aide, who gave him a ten-minute summary of a cable.

Khrushchev's behavior may have been the cause of the cancellation of two events, a scheduled speech to a youth congress in Bandung, called off "for security reasons," and the planned award of a doctorate by Gadjah Mada University. In a

speech in Surabaya, Sukarno denied that Communists were devils and, pointing to Khrushchev, he said, "Look at him here before you. He is not tall. He is a little fat. He is quite simple...."

Khrushchev has avoided any action which could be interpreted as support for Peiping in the dispute over Djakarta's treatment of Overseas Chinese. He has gone so far as to ignore completely the Chinese Communist ambassador during a state affair. He reportedly told Indonesian officials to "do what you think is right and don't worry."

Economic aid to Indonesia is probably the main topic of the talks between Sukarno and Khrushchev which began in Bali on 23 February and which may be resumed in Bogor. The Soviet leader probably will encourage more rapid implementation of Moscow's existing aid program to Indonesia. Progress on the projects under the Soviet \$100,000,000 aid credit of 1958 has thus far been slow, and only about \$27,000,000 has actually been drawn.

Khrushchev may be willing to supply additional bloc arms by offering to renegotiate the 1958 arms agreements, which Indonesia concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia, probably under Moscow's sponsorship. Under those agreements, totaling \$175,000,000, Indonesia did not receive the discounts normally extended by the bloc to arms purchasers. The inclusion in Khrushchev's party of Yemelyanov, chairman of the Soviet Atomic Energy Committee for Peaceful Purposes, may foreshadow some

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token agreement on atomic assistance for Indonesia which was specified under the original \$100,000,000 Soviet line of credit.

Indonesian Army leaders and non-Communist civilian government elements are hopeful that the apparent lack of rapport between Sukarno and Khrushchev will obviate any large-scale "deal" between the two.

Indonesian cabinet changes announced on 23 February involved no change in the government's present non-Communist complexion. Changes consist merely of upgrading to inner-cabinet status eight former junior ministers, all of whom retain their present portfolios, and the creation of a new inner-cabinet post, that of legal adviser to the President. The Defense Ministry, now called the Ministry of National Security, is still headed by Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, who appears to retain all the functions of his former office.

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SOVIET BLOC AID FOR INDIA

During Khrushchev's stay in India, an agreement was signed setting forth uses to which the USSR's \$375,000,000 credit will be put during India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). Most of it will be used to enlarge projects being constructed under earlier Soviet credits. No new aid was announced during Khrushchev's visit.


Total bloc credits thus far extended for Indian development amount to \$775,000,000. Of this total about \$550,000,000 --\$490,000,000 of it from the USSR--is available for use during the Third Five-Year Plan.

To gain the maximum propaganda benefit from its credit programs, the Soviet Union carried out an elaborate series

of announcements which often magnify the actual value of the aid. At present, with the beginning of India's next plan period more than a year away and with large credits still unused, Moscow probably sees no need to add to its already heavy commitments, and new assistance offers may be held back until present projects are further developed.

Although the bloc has already staked out a large share for itself in Indian development plans for the next decade, almost exclusively in the government-owned sector, credits used so far total less than \$200,000,000. The Bhilai steel plant is the only bloc-assisted project in production, and only a few others have passed from the planning and survey stage

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to actual construction. In spite of its relatively small size as compared with total Western aid, the Soviet program in India has won wide praise and influence both through skillful promotion and through the concentration of projects in the sectors of primary importance to Indian industrialization.

Soviet projects include iron and steel production, petroleum exploration and refining, coal mining, production of heavy machinery, and a variety of light industrial projects.

Poland recently joined the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania in the bloc's Indian program by offering a \$31,500,000

credit for the construction and equipment of various small industrial enterprises during the Third Five-Year Plan. In addition to formal aid agreements, all the European satellites and the USSR have trade agreements with India which in effect grant short-term credits by allowing repayments for industrial exports in nonconvertible rupees to be used for the purchase of Indian goods.

The first and most spectacular Soviet project undertaken



Soviet-built steel plant at Bhilai, India.

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in India, the Bhilai steel complex, has been producing pig iron for one year and began producing steel last October. The final work on the first stage of the plant is expected

to be finished this year. During the Third Five-Year Plan its annual capacity is to be increased from 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons. (Prepared by ORR)

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CHINESE COMMUNISTS SHOW IMPROVED AIR TACTICS

The attack on a routine Chinese Nationalist patrol by Communist jet fighters over the Taiwan Strait near the mainland on 16 February reflects an increase in Chinese Communist confidence since the fall of 1958, when Communist pilots suffered heavy losses at the hands of the more experienced Chinese Nationalists.

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SCANDINAVIAN - EAST GERMAN RELATIONS

Expanding semiofficial contacts between the Scandinavian countries and East Germany in a number of fields, particularly transportation, are disturbing Bonn and other Western governments, which feel that the international standing of the East German regime will thus be enhanced.

Bonn is particularly concerned about the increasing frequency of direct charter flights of the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) between points in the West and Schoenefeld airfield outside East Berlin. It believes these are no longer "practical commercial ventures between airlines," as argued by the Danes and the Norwegians, but in reality government agreements.

There is also evidence that Interflug, a subsidiary of the East German Lufthansa, wants to start regular flights between Schoenefeld and the Scandinavian capitals. In the past year, Interflug made special flights to Copenhagen during the Leipzig spring and

fall fairs, and now has gained approval for flights from Leipzig to Stockholm.

Last year, moreover, representatives of both the Danish and Swedish state railways held talks with East German officials on steps to facilitate travel by rail, highway, and ferry between their countries. In conjunction with these talks, the East Germans reportedly also pressed for the establishment of travel offices in the Scandinavian capitals with the hope of having these offices eventually issue visas. While there have been no reports of Scandinavian concurrence, the Danes are permitting nationals of East Germany to visit Denmark without obtaining clearance from the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin.

East Germany's campaign for eventual diplomatic recognition also tries to exploit established trade ties with the three Scandinavian countries, even though none of the commercial agreements is at a government level. The campaign is

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being pushed with the aid of ambitious industrial and trade fairs, increased tourism, extensive information programs, and propaganda attempts to arouse latent suspicions concerning West Germany. Next summer, an East German cruise ship carrying vacationing workers will call at Scandinavian ports, enabling it to show the regime's flag and publicize

East Germany's "socialist achievements."

Official and public opinion in Scandinavia remains opposed to diplomatic recognition of East Germany, but such opposition may gradually diminish as these various "practical" contacts increase and existing economic and cultural relations are broadened.

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NEW RESTRICTION ON WESTERN MISSIONS IN EAST GERMANY

Moscow has taken one more step to force the Western powers implicitly to recognize the East German regime. A new Soviet map delineating restricted areas in East Germany--received on 27 January by the Western military liaison missions (MLMs) accredited to the Soviet forces--leaves open to the missions only two checkpoints on the West German border, both manned only by East German border police. The Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn on the main access route to Berlin now is denied them.

access to West Germany, submitted to East German controls.

The MLMs have not had the same access rights as the Allied garrisons in Berlin, which are

The two checkpoints for MLM use are at Selmsdorf, in the north on the coastal highway between Luebeck in West Germany and Rostock on the East German coast, and at Wartha in the southwest on the autobahn to Frankfurt. Restriction to these two checkpoints would not seriously affect the operation of the MLMs, but a principle would be sacrificed if the missions, otherwise denied surface



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specifically allowed to use the Helmstedt autobahn under Soviet rather than East German control. The agreement of 5 April 1947 establishing the MLMs provides that "couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective commanders in chief" and "will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers." This agreement does not specifically preclude East German authority over these "couriers" at checkpoints as long as the diplomatic immunity is respected, nor does it specify Helmstedt as one access route.

Although this new Soviet move is not of itself a challenge to Allied rights of access to Berlin, acceptance of East German controls in this case could be cited as a precedent by the USSR in any subsequent move to impose East German authority on the access route to Berlin.

The missions for the time being, under instructions from their own governments, have suspended all travel to avoid use of the new Soviet passes with wording which implies recognition of East Germany.

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COLLECTIVIZATION DRIVE ENDED IN HUNGARY

Hungary's latest collectivization drive, which began shortly before the party congress last December, was ended formally on 12 February by a plenum of the central committee. The plenum, which heard reports by party First Secretary Janos Kadar and his top agricultural adviser, politburo member and secretary Lajos Feher, apparently decided to halt the drive in order to "consolidate" the farms which have been organized during the past two and a half months. Both Kadar and Feher attended the recent bloc meetings in Moscow.

To further the consolidation and achieve an over-all increase in agricultural production during the coming year, the regime has earmarked a record 7 billion forints (about \$300,000,000 at the most realistic official rate), a substantial increase over last year, for agricultural investments. More than half of this amount will be used to purchase 10,000 tractors, 4,000

mechanical planters, 1,400 combines, 2,400 grass scythes, and 3,500 fertilizer sprayers. The bulk of this machinery will be added to the existing motor stock of the machine-tractor stations, inasmuch as the Kadar regime is reluctant to allocate to the collective farms the more advanced or expensive types of machinery.

In the past two years, the proportion of Hungary's arable land cultivated by state farms, collectives, and cooperatives has risen from 29 to 70 percent, an increase achieved principally by intensive agitation-propaganda work among the peasants. Some 870,000 individuals are enrolled in collective farms, and six counties are described as on a fully cooperative farming basis.

The resolution of the 12 February plenum calls for an increase of 4.9 percent in over-all agricultural production in 1960. It lays particular

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stress on the formation of basic party units in the new farms and demands widespread preparations for spring sowing--probably as a consequence of last fall's unfavorable weather conditions. Last year many of the peasants were permitted to farm their plots individually even after their land had been formally

collectivized, but heavy investments, availability of more machinery, and active organizational work suggest that the regime plans to get many of the newly formed units into operation before spring sowing.

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POLAND CRITICIZED FOR SLOW PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURAL SOCIALIZATION

Poland reportedly came under fire at the recent bloc agricultural conference in Moscow for its slow progress toward collectivization and the low level of its farm production. The Poles


found it difficult to defend their collectivization policies, especially the development of the "agricultural circles"--organizations providing co-operative marketing and purchasing and common ownership of agricultural machinery and storage facilities.

Although the Soviet delegates reportedly did not attempt to pressure the Poles directly, they appeared to be taking

issue with Warsaw's policy in their statements that the circles should soon begin to demonstrate "socialist content" and show that socialization can be achieved through such forms. The Russians and representatives of other bloc countries pointed out that if the Polish circles do not make more rapid progress toward socialization, Poland will find itself with more than 3,000,000 inefficient small farms at a time when its neighbors have virtually completed collectivization. As a result, Warsaw will probably increase efforts to develop the circles in 1960.

The Poles are reported, however, to have held their own

THE SOCIALIZED SECTOR OF AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FARM LAND



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at the conference discussion on agricultural production, owing largely to a poor showing last year in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Party First Secretary Gomulka permitted Polish collective farms to disband in late 1956 and early 1957 to the point that the country today has fewer such farms than it had in 1950, but he has never abandoned the aim of ultimate collectivization. He realizes that peasant resistance would make a complete fiasco of any attempts to collectivize forcibly and would probably result in severe food shortages. He has stated on many occasions that collectivization must be voluntary, and that once peasants are convinced of the advantages of collective farming they will join of their own accord.

The regime has been encouraging the formation of the circles since early 1957. The

peasants, however, have shied away from them because of a deep-seated suspicion of the regime's motives, despite the incentives of substantial financial and technical assistance offered by the government.

The experience of a party activist who failed after two days of discussion to convince members of a circle to build a common storage place for apples is typical of the difficulties encountered by the regime. Reasons given by peasants for not building the storage facility included: too much paper work; it would only be another object for the state to tax; the state would soon enact a law placing it under control of some other organization; its construction would be a step toward the hated collectivization; and the Russians were pushing the idea.

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LATVIAN NATIONALISM STILL CONCERNS MOSCOW

The latest move aimed at checking the currents of nationalism and "ideological infirmity" in the Soviet Baltic republic of Latvia has brought a new shake-up in the top party command within the republic. Reports on the proceedings of a recent party plenum reveal that at least two members--in addition to first secretary Yan Kalnberzin, removed last November--of the five-member secretariat have been replaced.

Many of the non-Russian republics have witnessed top-level

shifts during the last year, but in none has the charge of nationalism been raised as frequently and explicitly as in Latvia. The party has indicated it feels that the solution of such related problems as economic performance and ideological discipline hinges largely on its success in uprooting what it chooses to describe as "harmful ideas which come from abroad." Particular concern has been shown for the attitudes of Latvian youths. The continuing political charges and the accompanying propaganda drumfire indicate that Moscow, after nearly

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20 years of control of the Baltic republic, is still contending with what it considers an unhealthy degree of nationalist spirit.

The issue was first aired publicly last August, soon after the dismissal of Eduard Berklav as deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. The chairman of the council at that time charged that Berklav had argued for increased investments in Latvian "light industry and food industry, the products of which must be consumed largely within the republic." Berklav was guilty of other, similar economic heresies which, it was charged, "signified nothing but a desire for autarky, national exclusiveness, and isolation."

Arvid Pelshe, installed in Kalnberzin's post as party chief in last November's sweeping reorganization of top posts, has subsequently reinforced the indictment of Berklav, alleging in Pravda on 27 January that the ousted official--and

others--had "started to slip away from the party's class position and allowed distortions of Lenin's nationality policy." Pelshe also revealed some concern about the orientation of the upcoming generation. "It is no secret," he wrote, "that the upbringing of the future man takes place during a difficult and sharp struggle against the influence of the decaying bourgeois morals and ideology, as well as against the harmful ideas which come from abroad."

Pelshe indicated that a shake-up of editorial staffs would be one means of dealing with ideological softness, and the editor of the leading Latvian-language newspaper has since been fired. The appointment in January of a new party secretary, whose specialty has been party organizational affairs, may also mean that a careful scrutiny of lower party officials is in the offing.

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YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The death of Cardinal Stepinac on 10 February removed one of the major obstacles to a formal improvement of relations between the Vatican and the Tito regime. Stepinac had been convicted in 1946 of collaboration during World War II with the pro-Nazi Ustashi puppet state of Croatia. His appointment as cardinal in 1952, while he was still imprisoned on this charge, led Belgrade to break off diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

During the past year Belgrade's attitude toward the church has been more conciliatory. The regime officially congratulated Anton Vovk on his appointment as resident bishop of Ljubljana and allowed him--as well as other churchmen--to go to Rome, and has permitted Communists to have their children baptized. To these gestures is added the decision to allow Stepinac's burial services to take place in Zagreb Cathedral--the seat of his diocese--rather than in Krasic, his native village. This act has been termed a "post-mortem amnesty" by a Yugoslav official in Zagreb.

Several difficult problems remain, however, including the questions of religious education for Catholic children and of the clergy's rights in carrying out its work. The education issue is particularly difficult, as the same problem exists in relation to all religious and ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, particularly in the Orthodox and Islamic centers in the southern parts of the country.

There have been limited improvements in church-state

relations during the past year. Vladimir Bakaric, Communist President of Croatia, in commenting on 16 February on the recent trials in Croatia involving the clergy, stated that the regime was "not conducting antireligious propaganda," but only keeping "politics out of the church."

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The day before Stepinac died, 80-year-old Archbishop Ujic of Belgrade was awarded the "Order for Services to the People, First Class" for his efforts to define the position of the church in its relations with the state.

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The elimination of church-state irritants would enhance Belgrade's standing in Catholic Latin America and the Islamic Middle East. The reported release by the Vatican on 22 February of Cardinal Stepinac's 1957 last testament, which is highly critical of Communism in Yugoslavia, may prove, however, to be an obstacle to an improvement in relations between the Vatican and Tito's regime. In view of Tito's general interest in winning support in these areas, there is considerable inducement for him to effect a settlement with the Vatican.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL OUTLOOK IN BOLIVIA

Bolivia's governing party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)--whose firm control virtually guarantees the outcome of the elections to be held next May or June--has chosen former President Victor Paz Estenssoro as its candidate for president and key labor leader Juan Lechin as his running mate. The nominating convention chose the left-wing leader Lechin despite strong opposition from Paz, who apparently saw this choice as a blow to his plans to act as mediator between the left and right wings of the party.

Paz's term as president from 1952 to 1956 was marked by sweeping reforms--extension of suffrage to the illiterate Indian majority, nationalization of the tin mines, and a radical agrarian reform decree. His



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greatest achievement was development of petroleum resources through a government oil company, and the resultant change of Bolivia's position from a net importer to an exporter of oil.

During this period Paz was regarded as the one man who could maintain a balance between the two wings of the MNR--the right wing headed by incumbent



PAZ

President Hernan Siles and the left wing headed by Juan Lechin. His future efforts in this direction, however, will be hampered by the choice of Lechin for the vice presidency and by the weakness of the party's right wing. With Lechin as vice president, Paz will have trouble avoiding total alienation of the middle-class elements of the party.

Intraparty rivalries may lead to new outbreaks of violence in the next few weeks, since most political leaders in Bolivia are backed by groups of armed civilians. Serious violence in recent months, both in the mining areas and in the agricultural section near Bolivia's second largest city, Cochabamba, has threatened civil war.

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CYPRUS

The arrival of Julian Amery as a British negotiator in Nicosia on 23 February has revived speculation among Cypriots that Britian is about to offer new concessions in an effort to resolve the dispute over the size of British military bases. In London, however, a Foreign Office official says Amery's objective is merely to confirm agreements already reached with Archbishop Makarios on other points at issue, such as problems regarding civil administration within the bases and potential British financial aid to Cyprus.

Following this, the British official says, London will make a "superhuman" effort to see if anything more can be done to end the dispute over the size of the bases. He states, however, that any "adjustments" in size would be small and would not live up to the optimistic speculation in the Cypriot press.

There are ominous indications that the recent close collaboration between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders may be weakening. Turkish Cypriot leader Kuchuk, in particular, has collaborated closely with Makarios on the issue of the

bases and has demonstrated considerable initiative in attempting to find a compromise solution. It now appears that Kuchuk has incurred the displeasure of leaders in Ankara who regard the British bases on Cyprus as vital to Turkey's security.

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A change in Kuchuk's stand would be a serious blow to Makarios and would tend to revive the latent distrust between the two communities on Cyprus. Within his own community, the archbishop can retain his prestige only by securing some further concessions from Britian. Any indication that he is weakening in the controversy with London would bring down immediate attacks on him from extremists of both the right and left. While Makarios would probably survive such attacks, his own influence and that of his moderate, pro-Western advisers could be diminished, to the detriment of the new Cypriot government's stability and possibly also to the detriment of long-range Western interests on Cyprus.

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NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE

Kerala's non-Communist political leaders resumed control of the state government on 22 February after nearly three years out of power. Formation of a coalition government by the Congress and Praja Socialist parties climaxed the drive begun last summer which led to

the ouster of the Communist regime and the victory of the anti-Communist united front in a special state election on 1 February. Congress and Socialist candidates, together with those of the Moslem League, won 75 percent of the state assembly seats.

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Dissension among the victorious coalition parties at first threatened to block formation of a new government. Intensive negotiations during the first three weeks of February became deadlocked over the question of the Moslem League's participation. The league's demand for one ministry, which was strongly supported by the Praja Socialists, was unacceptable to the dominant Congress party. Resistance to the inclusion of the Moslems came primarily from the national Congress leaders, who regard the league as an alien communal organization and who feared that Hindu-Moslem cooperation in Kerala would provide Hindu extremist elements in northern India with an opportunity to stir up communal antagonisms.

The Moslem League eventually withdrew its demand, enabling the Congress and Socialist leaders to work out a two-party coalition, which the Moslems promised to support in the assembly. The Congress party agreed to let Praja Socialist

leader Pattom Thanu Pillai head the government, while reserving for Congress politicians eight of the other ten cabinet seats. Pillai, a 75-year-old former Congress leader who has served as chief minister twice previously, is considered to have greater prestige in Kerala than any of the Congress leaders.

The personal rivalries and communal differences which delayed the formation of the new cabinet probably will also hamper the non-Communist parties in establishing a stable and effective government. Pillai's tendency to run a one-man show may antagonize his coalition partners. The Congress party's preponderant strength in both the cabinet and the assembly, however, will help its leaders keep Pillai in line and maintain unity. In addition, the considerable mass support retained by the Communists in Kerala and their capability for exploiting any government shortcomings will give the anti-Communist parties a strong incentive to maintain their cooperation.

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PAKISTANI PRESIDENT MOVES TO RESTORE "CONSTITUTIONAL" GOVERNMENT

Pakistani President Ayub is continuing his efforts to give his regime the appearance of representative government, but apparently intends to keep control in his own hands. His prestige seems to have reached the highest level since the first days following the army takeover in October 1958. His regime has given Pakistan a stronger and more stable government, strengthened the country's economy, and raised its international reputation. In addition, Ayub in his recent successful tours of West and East Pakistan demonstrated

increasing confidence and skill as a politician.

Ayub arranged a "vote of confidence" on 14 February, obtaining favorable votes from about 95 percent of the 80,000 newly elected members of the recently established local councils. This vote constitutes his election as president for the first term of office under the proposed new constitution. Ayub took a new oath of office on 17 February. Cabinet members submitted pro forma resignations, and were immediately reappointed.

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On the same day, the President appointed a commission to prepare proposals for a new constitution which will probably follow the lines he has already described in public. The draft is expected to be completed by next fall. Ayub apparently wants to use representative institutions such as the local councils to gain support for the government, but he does not want these institutions to interfere with the centralized authority which he believes to be necessary for a competent administration.

He also advocates a strong executive, dominated by the president and not subject to recall by the legislature. Ayub apparently will ask for some system of checks to prevent political parties from harming

the national interest, as he believes happened before the 1958 army takeover.

During the coming months Ayub will probably have his hands full making an effective instrument of government out of the newly elected local councils. These councils are to be given major responsibilities in carrying out national development programs at the local level. A large proportion of the members are without previous government or administrative experience. Many who do have such experience probably have ties with the ousted political parties and may resent the regime. Even if the regime secures the wholehearted cooperation of these new councils, it would have a major job educating them to their tasks.

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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CONGO

Communist propaganda in the Congo and efforts to penetrate nationalist groups appear to be increasing with the prospect of independence on 30 June. Congolese delegates at the round-table talks in Brussels were contacted by various Soviet bloc trade representatives, who reportedly outlined attractive barter proposals to be implemented following Congolese independence.

Communist activity in the Congo during the past year involved primarily the introduction of propaganda material and the granting of scholarships for study in the bloc. The Czechoslovak Consulate, the only official bloc mission in Leopoldville, is believed to have supported these efforts as well as penetration operations aimed at nationalist

groups. Among the Belgian Communists there have been some indications of dissatisfaction with what they believe to be the low level of Communist activity in the Congo.

The Communists may recently have increased their influence within two of the most important African groups, the Abako and the Congo National Movement (MNC). Propaganda organs of the Abako have lately taken on pro-Communist and anti-American overtones, while officials of the MNC wing led by Patrice Lumumba are believed to have been in frequent contact with Belgian Communists.

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Communist penetration efforts have been aided considerably by the Congo's accelerated rush toward independence, which has prompted numerous Congolese politicians to seek foreign financial support for legislative elections, some of which are scheduled as early as April. Delegates to the round-table talks in Brussels are known to have made side trips to the bloc and elsewhere.

Congolese delegates were "constantly contacted" by bloc representatives with offers of economic assistance.

In some instances, however, the Congolese appear to have sought aid from non-Communist sources.

Communist influence was not apparent during the actual negotiations in Brussels, where African delegates of various political shadings were largely united in their efforts to wrest maximum concessions from the Belgians. The conference ended on 20 February after Brussels had agreed to virtually every major Congolese demand.

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LABOR UNREST IN WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY

West Berlin and West Germany face the threat of a strike by 1,200,000 public service, transportation, and communication workers. The member unions, including those in West Berlin, are scheduled to start voting on 25 February regarding management's latest wage offers.

Labor leaders, who have been moderate in their demands during the past decade, now argue that rising prices and business profits justify substantial increases and that labor deserves a larger share of national income. This is the first of several demands German labor will make during 1960. The Bonn government, however, wants wage increases limited to hold down inflationary pressures.

In the recent round of transport negotiations held in Bad Kreuznach, the labor leaders reduced their demands for a wage increase of 15 percent to one of 11 percent, while the management representatives increased their wage and salary offers from 5 percent to

maximums of 10.5 and 8.5 percent, respectively. Despite the impression that this narrowing would produce a settlement, negotiations were broken off by the labor leaders on 17 February after a 22-hour session.

Any settlement in West Germany would presumably extend also to West Berlin. The West Berlin union leaders, however, have taken a stronger stand than their more conservative counterparts in West Germany, and have indicated a willingness to strike for "several weeks" if necessary. A strike of longer than 36 hours would probably cause the city's gas and water pressure to fall to a point where services would cease.

In the event of a West Berlin strike, the East Germans might take "sympathy" action, as they did during a 24-hour demonstration walkout in 1958, by cutting off elevated S-Bahn train service to West Berlin. Communist agitators are already circulating leaflets in West Berlin urging workers to stand firm in their original 15-percent wage demands.

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BRITISH PUBLIC PRESSURES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

The Macmillan government finds itself under slowly increasing public pressure to reach a disarmament agreement.

Considerations of domestic opinion only partially account for the recurrent efforts of the British delegation at the Geneva test-suspension talks to explore possible compromises between the American and Soviet positions--efforts which the Soviet delegation is seeking to exploit. Testing is probably of decreasing importance to Britain's own defense program in view of the tendency to de-em-

phasize the nuclear aspect. British officials consider that world opinion is susceptible to Soviet propaganda blandishments on the testing issue.

British opinion appears to be the government's greatest concern, however. According to an opinion survey in November, almost as many of those polled named the USSR as the US as the country making the more serious effort toward general disarmament. On the test ban issue, the press supports Macmillan's desire for a comprehensive ban, and has viewed

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favorably Moscow's insistence that any agreement include at least a moratorium on all underground testing. The heavy press play given reports that the United States is preparing to resume underground tests tends to blame Washington for blocking progress.

A skillful pressure group, composed principally of non-Communist intellectuals, which seeks unilateral nuclear disarmament has played on latent British fears that nuclear warfare would obliterate civilized life in the United Kingdom. The American Embassy in London believes this group has gained

some increased publicity during the past year, partly through demonstrations at military installations on news-sparse week ends. Among the group's prominent supporters is Frank Cousins, leader of Britain's largest trade union.

Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell rejects unilateral disarmament for Britain and has agreed to only slight compromises in his party's stand, but maintains continuing pressure in Parliament for the government to show progress toward a disarmament agreement starting with a suspension of nuclear tests.

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
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PART III**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****THE KHRUSHCHEV - DE GAULLE MEETING**

Khrushchev and De Gaulle will each probably use the Soviet leader's visit to France from 15 to 28 March to explore the other's intentions for the summit meeting in May.

The invitation stems both from De Gaulle's determination to demonstrate France's status

as a great power, and from his desire to develop a European initiative toward furthering an East-West detente. The Kremlin has long considered France a vulnerable link in the Western alliance, and De Gaulle's policies have probably sharpened Moscow's expectations of new opportunities to exploit possible

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differences between France and its allies. De Gaulle's apprehension over Communist advances in Africa and his hope for a Moscow-Peiping misunderstanding may encourage him to explore the possibility of a mutual accommodation with the Soviet Union.

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The French leader apparently is convinced that Khrushchev does not want war be-

Extreme rightist opponents of the regime are using the visit to characterize De Gaulle as a "man of the left" who is about to sell France out to the Soviet Union. Their plans for anti-Khrushchev demonstrations have probably been stymied, however, by the government's roundups in connection with the Algerian crisis last month.

Background of the Invitation

De Gaulle made the Khrushchev visit an "indispensable" condition for French participation in an East-West summit meeting, in view of British Prime Minister Macmillan's trip to Moscow and Khrushchev's trip to the United States in 1959.



"SEND FOR PICASSO!"

PARIS: NOUVEAUX JOURS, 6 NOVEMBER 1959

cause the Soviet Union "must reckon with a growing class of technicians and managers who want higher living standards and more security." Moreover, De Gaulle sees the growing strength of Communist China as an additional pressure to "Europeanize" the Soviet Union.

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The USSR and De Gaulle

The Soviet attitude toward France was formulated by Khrushchev shortly before De Gaulle returned to power. In an interview with a French paper, the Soviet leader stressed that the USSR had no reason to fear a strong France, because "the more France displays its independence as a great power, the easier it will be, by joint effort, to achieve a settlement of European and world problems." Khrushchev's remarks underline the Soviet Union's long-standing belief that it can encourage France to move toward an independent position on key East-West issues, especially the German question.

Soviet confidence that an intensified French nationalism can be exploited by dividing France from its allies has probably been reinforced by De Gaulle's actions over the past year and a half.

Moscow's policy of restraint and caution in criticizing De Gaulle is a further reflection of the priority which the USSR assigns to generating divisions within the West.

De Gaulle's failure to actively oppose Anglo-American policy during the Middle East crisis in 1958 and his subsequent

demonstration that he intended to maintain close ties with Bonn probably led to a downgrading of the Soviet estimate that immediate opportunities for Moscow would be developed by De Gaulle.

Khrushchev, however, emphasized in a Pravda article of 22 September 1958 his conviction that re-emergence of the historic conflicts between France and Germany was merely a matter of time.

As a corollary to this thesis, Khrushchev advanced his appraisal that traditional French national interests closely coincided with the Soviet interest in containing the revival of German military power. During the Berlin crisis Moscow repeatedly directed warnings to Paris against the danger of a revived Germany.

The Soviet objective of cultivating De Gaulle personally was clearly evident after the Soviet leader's return from the United States. After Khrushchev had failed to gain agreement on a summit conference before the end of 1959, he conceded that De Gaulle's desire to exchange views prior to the summit was not "unreasonable and could make for a better understanding" at the East-West meeting. Moreover, Khrushchev's moderate handling of De Gaulle's efforts to delay a summit contrasted sharply with his repeated attacks on Adenauer for the same reasons.

Khrushchev also took pains to respond to French views that some evidence of decreased tensions was necessary before agreeing to meet at the summit. The Soviet leader's cautious endorsement of De Gaulle's program for Algeria was an obvious gesture to appear responsive to French conditions for the heads-of-government meeting.

On Algeria, Moscow has tried to avoid antagonizing De Gaulle,

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while still maintaining a public posture as the champion of anticolonialist movements. During the recent crisis in Algeria, Soviet propaganda media firmly endorsed De Gaulle's handling of the situation and lauded his 29 January statement on self-determination there.

Khrushchev in France

During his meetings with De Gaulle, the Soviet premier will probably maintain a reserved and conciliatory attitude, most recently evident in his reaction to the French atomic test. He is determined, however, to maintain pressure for a German settlement based on a peace treaty with both German states which would confirm the postwar division of Europe. Khrushchev's dismissal on 5 August 1959 of the Bonn-Paris axis as a "marriage of convenience" is a reflection of his conviction that growing German military strength provides a field for maneuver in bargaining for French concessions on Germany. As Khrushchev put it in his speech on 14 November to Soviet journalists, "De Gaulle understands the danger of a revival of German revanchism."

Khrushchev will also probably tie the dangers of German militarism to the problem of disarmament in Europe. Mindful of De Gaulle's preoccupation with "doing something for the Poles," Khrushchev can be expected to press for a favorable consideration of a partial disarmament agreement in Central Europe along the lines of the Rapacki plan.

The main themes which Khrushchev will develop for French public consumption will be that the balance of power has shifted toward "the socialist camp" and that there is an irreversible trend in the West toward accommodation with the Soviet position. He will attempt to make it clear that such an accommodation is in the interest of France as a great power, and he probably will suggest that the French should take an active part in promoting a European settlement. An indispensable condition, however, will be his insistence that Paris acknowledge the postwar situation in Eastern Europe.

As Khrushchev sees it, the interests of France and the USSR do not "objectively collide," and their policies on Germany differ in form but not in substance.

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In this connection, Khrushchev will explore the possibility of a more formal endorsement by De Gaulle of the status quo in the East along the lines of the French leader's remarks in March 1959 on the permanency of Germany's postwar boundaries. Shortly after that statement by De Gaulle, Moscow used a TASS statement to respond with an expression that "this is a correct, realistic approach," and Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on 31 October that "we greatly appreciate the realistic statement" by De Gaulle and Debré on the "inviolability" of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

De Gaulle on Summit Issues

On the issue of Germany, De Gaulle is unlikely to go beyond his suggestion that increased political contacts between East and West Germany would be desirable short of recognition of the East German regime. His views were presumably reflected in Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's expression of doubt in November that the Berlin question is "ripe" for settlement. Couve de Murville said again in December that a summit meeting would be a success if "some practical agreements" were achieved on the other two problems: disarmament and East-West relations.

De Gaulle reportedly agrees with Adenauer that the disarmament issue should be the "acid test" of Soviet intentions. Paris would assign first priority to the abolition of all delivery systems for nuclear weapons and second to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

It opposes any agreement on nuclear test cessation which does not provide for the destruction of nuclear stocks and for a general disarmament in conventional weapons. The recent French demonstration of approaching nuclear weapons capability is more likely to reinforce than soften this position.

African considerations underlie De Gaulle's insistence that the summit agenda include discussion of his proposals for nonintervention by states in each other's affairs and for a joint East-West aid program for underdeveloped areas. De Gaulle is seeking to bar arms shipments to "neutral" states, and he envisages global apportionment of underdeveloped areas into Eastern and Western spheres of influence--with Africa within the Western complex.

Khrushchev's prospective visit to Africa, particularly Guinea, probably sharpens French apprehension, and De Gaulle is certain to press Khrushchev on these points.

Curbs on Peiping

De Gaulle can also be expected to probe for any signs of Soviet willingness to curb Peiping. Although De Gaulle seems increasingly taken up with the hope of aligning Moscow with the West against Peiping, Paris is probably more and more inclined to envisage some formal agreement on disarmament as ultimately including Peiping.

There are some indications that in addition to an expansion of trade and cultural

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exchanges, an agreement on Soviet-French scientific exchange may be reached.

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LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CASTRO REGIME

Fidel Castro's regime has lost prestige in other Latin American capitals because of its authoritarian methods at home, its susceptibility to Communist influence, and its unorthodox behavior in hemisphere affairs. Only a few Latin American leaders, however, are prepared to dismiss Castro as a mere radical demagogue who has lost all chance of making in the long run a positive contribution to Cuba; for many Latin Americans in general, particularly the less sophisticated, Castro remains an important political symbol. His proclaimed objectives parallel those of numerous groups throughout the hemisphere, and concerted Cuban efforts to appeal to dissatisfied and oppressed groups in many countries may be making headway.

Castro's Tactics

The Castro regime has rapidly dissipated the considerable good will it enjoyed among Latin American leaders when it assumed power in January 1959. The authoritarian tactics that belie Castro's proclaimed democratic ideals quickly became apparent and have progressively eroded the Cuban leader's prestige among democratically oriented Latin American governments.

President Lopez Mateos of Mexico has publicly expressed regret that the Cuban revolution is not proceeding according to constitutional paths. The responsible press and government officials in Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, and other countries are showing increasing disgust with the undemocratic attitudes and actions of Cuban leaders.

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Communist Influence

The growth of Communist influence in Cuba is another cause for serious concern in Latin American capitals. Although few officials consider Fidel Castro a Communist, many are convinced that close aides such as Che Guevara and Raul Castro are promoting Communist objectives and that the premier himself is in danger of becoming a captive of the Communists. The Mikoyan visit this month and the resulting close economic ties seem to have further alarmed Latin American observers.

The Liberal party's El Tiempo in Colombia declared that the Mikoyan visit will "fortify the influence, already considerable, of Communism in the government, with all that this signifies." President Betancourt of Venezuela is reported "very disturbed" at the implications of the Cuban-Soviet agreement.

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Unorthodox Diplomacy

Castro's diplomatic representatives, many of them young, inexperienced, and imbued with revolutionary fervor, have irritated a number of Latin American governments by their unorthodox behavior and blatant propaganda activities. His ambassadors in El Salvador and Venezuela had to be recalled late last year because of their indiscretions. Cuban envoys in Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama have irritated the governments or important political groups by becoming involved in domestic affairs. The Chilean and Venezuelan governments formerly protested the unannounced and undocumented arrivals of Cuban military planes in their countries last summer and fall.

Attitude Toward OAS

Numerous Latin American leaders fear that the Castro regime's indifferent and occasionally hostile attitude toward the Organization of American States (OAS) and other inter-American organizations will weaken hemispheric cooperation. Direct Cuban support for revolutionary movements opposing the regimes in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua last summer was in defiance of the ardently professed Latin American principle of nonintervention.

Fidel Castro attacked the meeting of foreign ministers in Santiago de Chile last August as a "farce," and Raul Castro described the OAS as a "worthless organization" unresponsive to the real interests of the people. More recently, Cuban officials have ridiculed the new Inter-American Development Bank as of little use be-

cause of its alleged domination by the United States; Cuba is the only Latin American country not to become a member.

Latin Americans look askance at the Cuban Government's efforts to identify itself with the Asian-African neutralists, and have been definitely cool toward Castro's proposal to hold a world conference of "hungry nations" in Havana late next summer. They doubt Cuban assurances that the conference is to be purely economic and technical. Cuba has been unable to secure the agreement of any Latin American government to cosponsor the conference, and only Mexico, Venezuela, and possibly Panama have agreed--even conditionally--to send representatives. Most countries oppose holding the conference but may feel obliged to attend if many Latin American governments do so. Brazil regards it as a direct threat to the success of Operation Pan America, its plan for strengthening inter-American ties.

In another move which threatens hemispheric solidarity, Cuba has been actively campaigning in the UN for election to the Security Council, without first asking customary support from the Latin American caucus. Several Latin American countries had already indicated approval of a prior Chilean bid for caucus support, but Cuba's candidacy seems to have elicited some Latin American support too. Cuba's move will probably lessen caucus effectiveness on other issues as well.

US-Cuban Relations

Many leading Latin Americans, including some who have their own strong grievances against US policies, have expressed surprise at the

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bitterness of Castro's invective against the United States. The Uruguayan newspaper Accion--mouthpiece for the leftist politician Luis Batlle Berres, who has been an especially caustic critic of the United States--warned Castro not to lose contact with his liberal-minded friends in the United States.

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The majority of Latin American leaders approve the moderation of President Eisenhower's 26 January statement on Cuba and have indicated admiration and relief that it was basically conciliatory. Chilean President Alessandri and Colombian President Lleras Camargo in January declared they understood the US Government was under considerable provocation but expressed the belief that any punitive steps or anything resembling force against Castro would strengthen rather than weaken him. They counseled continued moderation and patience.

The widely respected Chilean diplomat Benjamin Cohen has expressed a viewpoint probably shared by many thoughtful Latin American leaders who believe that Castro has not yet lost all opportunity of making, on balance, a positive contribution to Cuba. Cohen pointed out in mid-February that the Cuban situation must be viewed in the context of a drastic social revolution, with its inevitable violence and disorganization, and that the issue of Communism is only incidental to this central fact.

The newspaper El Pais, owned by Panamanian President de la Guardia, published somewhat similar views: "The balance of history is, up to now, favorable. The new Cuba shows a series of victories, which,

without doubt, any other Latin American country would have taken much longer to achieve. Every revolution has its mistakes--and necessary bloodshed."

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Appeal in Latin America

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The general feeling of inferiority in dealing with the United States probably has a large part in the dramatic appeal Castro apparently holds for many Latin Americans.

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In addition, the picture of Castro as a courageous fighter against a corrupt dictatorship is still valid for many Latin American people, especially the less sophisticated. Castro's drastic agrarian reform program and his controls over private capital also evoke a sympathetic response in a continent where abusive social practices by a small wealthy class are frequent. Communists, always quick to exploit Latin American grievances, have become, along with such Communist-influenced parties as the Chilean Socialist party, Castro's most uncritical defenders in the hemisphere.

Although Castro has alienated the top leaders of important Latin American

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leftist-nationalist non-Communist parties such as APRA of Peru, Democratic Action of Venezuela, and National Liberation of Costa Rica, sympathy for Castro remains strong in the lower echelons of these parties. An APRA rally on 7 January revealed strong discontent among secondary party leaders, youths, students, and the more radical elements because of the moderate policies of the party leadership and its refusal to come out strongly in favor of Castro and advocate Castro-type policies for Peru.

President Betancourt, head of the Venezuelan party, is faced with a similar dilemma, as is former Costa Rican President Figueres, head of the National Liberation party, who publicly broke with Castro last April. These leaders--who are perhaps more bitterly disillusioned with Castro because they once aided him and pinned great

hopes on him--have tried to distinguish between Castro and the Cuban revolution by continuing to support the revolution while refusing to endorse Castro's methods. This distinction, however, eludes most party members.

The Castro regime seems well aware of its large reservoir of sympathy among presently disorganized and less articulate groups in many countries. Havana's diplomatic representatives, Cuban labor groups, and the Castro-subsidized news agency Prensa Latina are embarked on a concerted campaign to appeal to the masses over the heads of the governments.

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STATUS OF OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The status and influence of the approximately 12,000,000 Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has generally declined over the past decade. Disliked for their cultural separatism, envied for their economic prowess, and feared for their subversive potential, they have come under steadily increasing pressures and surveillance by their host governments, except in Singapore, where the Chinese control the government, and, to a lesser extent, in the Federation of Malaya, where the Chinese have a voice in the government by virtue of their large numbers and economic dominance.

China's emergence as a major power in the region following World War II and the decline of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia gave prominence to the position of the Overseas

Chinese communities. However, postwar political developments have placed them under new nationalist governments which are particularly sensitive to the presence of alien communities. With the Communist victory on the mainland, the Overseas Chinese have come to be regarded as potential bases of Communist infiltration and subversion. These fears are well grounded.

The overwhelming majority of Overseas Chinese, although emotionally attached to their cultural heritage and their ancestral homes on the mainland, are not ideologically motivated. As in the past, they remain politically apathetic and are concerned primarily with their personal security and economic opportunities. They continue to promote these interests directly with local authorities. Except

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in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, they are not in a position to undertake concerted action against their host governments. Even in Malaya, despite the economic power of the Chinese, such an effort would result in severe governmental reprisals.

Nationalist-Communist Rivalry

Peiping and Taipei are competing for the loyalty of the Overseas Chinese, and both generally consider ethnic Chinese, regardless of place of birth, as Chinese nationals. Both governments allot legislative seats--in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan and Peiping's National People's Congress--to the overseas communities, encourage visits from overseas

OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(CURRENT ESTIMATES)

COUNTRY	TOTAL POPULATION	CHINESE	PERCENTAGE
BURMA	19,500,000	450,000	2.6
CAMBODIA	5,000,000	300,000	6.0
INDONESIA	85,000,000	3,000,000	3.5
LAOS	2,000,000	30,000	1.5
MALAYA	6,300,000	2,343,400	37.2
PHILIPPINES	22,000,000	330,000	1.5
SINGAPORE	1,185,000	1,550,000	76.5
THAILAND	21,000,000	3,171,000	15.1
SOUTH VIETNAM	12,100,000	830,000	6.9

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community leaders, and have offered scholarships to Overseas Chinese students.

The two regimes work principally through their diplomatic and consular establishments. Thus the Chinese Nationalist Government is more successful in the Philippines, South Vietnam,



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Laos, and Thailand, while the Chinese Communist regime dominates where it is represented--in Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia.

In this effort, Communist China in the countries where it is recognized is making effective use of its Bank of China branches as instruments of persuasion and for the transfer of remittances to the mainland. The Bank of China is an important instrument in Singapore, and had similar importance in Malaya until the recent closure of its branches there.

In Southeast Asia as a whole, the Chinese Communist regime has had more appeal than the Chinese Nationalist. It has considerable influence with the majority of Chinese-language publications and schools, as well as Chinese associations. This is attributable more to Peiping's demonstration of military strength, vitality, and apparent permanence than to its propaganda campaign.

Peiping's influence on the Chinese of Southeast Asia has recently been diminished by the generally unfavorable reaction to its suppression of the Tibetan revolt, its commune program, and by the reports of disillusioned Chinese returning from visits to the mainland. The Chinese of Malaya and Singapore were particularly disillusioned by the failure of Peiping to produce the goods it offered in its 1958 economic offensive.

Chinese in Laos

The Chinese communities of Laos, Malaya, and Singapore, for differing reasons, are the least subject to governmental harassment in Southeast Asia. In Laos, the Chinese community is small--approximately 30,000, or 1.5 percent of the population--and the Chinese are accepted as an integral part of the heterogeneous society. The Chinese Nationalists opened a consulate last year, but it has

had little impact on the local Chinese. The Laotian Government is preoccupied with the threat of the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat, and has neither time nor inclination to interfere with the Chinese community. Even the presence of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in the Burmese-Laotian border area--anathema to Rangoon--is viewed with mild favor by Vientiane.

Malaya and Singapore

In the Federation of Malaya, terrorist tactics of the Malayan Communist party, almost exclusively Chinese, as well as the demands of the independence movement have forced conservative Chinese community leaders into politics. They are associated through the Malayan Chinese Association with the United Malay National Organization in the government, although only as a junior partner. Both elements support, at least publicly, the "Malayanization" of the population.

Communal problems generated by the mutual distrust between the Malays (50 percent of the population) and the Chinese (37.2 percent) dominate governmental thinking. The politically dominant Malays prefer to have the Chinese isolated from the influence of both Chinese regimes. Chinese cultural ties with the mainland are strong, however, and pro-Communist sentiments are particularly evident among Chinese students.

The situation in Singapore is unique: a left-wing government which is dominated by Chinese is minimizing Chinese cultural ties and is encouraging the development of a "Malayan" society. Some 1,185,000 out of Singapore's 1,550,000 citizens are Chinese, culturally oriented toward the mainland, and much influenced by local pro-Communist leaders. The government, motivated mainly by economic necessity to seek closer ties leading to the long-range goal of merger, is attempting to improve relations with the

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anti-Communist and aloof government of Malaya.

Burma and Cambodia

In Burma and Cambodia, where the Chinese populations are 2.6 and 6 percent respectively, the Chinese communities are in relatively good standing. In both countries other alien minorities are more disliked by the local populations and governments than the Chinese--the Indians in Burma, and the Vietnamese in Cambodia.

Peiping holds a commanding position in the competition for the loyalties of Burma's Chinese through its geographic location and evident political and economic power. As a result, it has gained control over most Chinese institutions in the country. The pro-Nationalist Chinese, hampered by a lack of funds and by the depredations of the Nationalist irregulars in the northeastern part of the country, appear to be losing ground, and their influence probably will continue to decline in view of the recently concluded Sino-Burmese border agreement and nonaggression treaty.

There are between 450,000 and 500,000 Chinese residents of Burma, who, unless they have formally declared their Chinese citizenship, are generally accorded the privileges of Burmese citizenship. Inter-marriage with Burmese is frequent, and the Chinese assimilate easily into Burmese society. Nevertheless, most Chinese have retained their cultural identity and are objects of government suspicion. Formal discrimination against Chinese does not exist, but the government's efforts to force aliens out of major economic activities has ended the Chinese domination of rice marketing and mining and forced the Chinese into less important commercial fields, where they have little influence with the government.

The 300,000 Chinese in Cambodia are in a similar position. Through its large embassy, Peiping has gained control over most Chinese institutions, and pro-Nationalist Chinese are severely handicapped by lack of funds and the absence of diplomatic representation. Communist advances have been slowed, however, by the unfavorable reaction to developments on the mainland in the past year.

Thailand's Chinese

The position of Thailand's 3,171,000 Chinese, 15.1 percent of the population, differs from the other Chinese communities in that for more than 50 years they have been under varying degrees of governmental pressure to become Thai in citizenship and culture. Many still maintain their cultural identity, despite effective governmental control over their schools--in which the time allowed to Chinese studies is limited and the use of Thai curricula required--economic restrictions, and limitations on Chinese immigration.

Formally, at least, the Overseas Chinese have maintained loyalty to Nationalist China, in keeping with the Thai Government's outlook, and Communist China appears to have little overt support from them. The clandestine Chinese Communist party of Thailand may have succeeded, however, in organizing segments of the Chinese population in Thailand.

Vietnam and The Philippines

The Chinese communities of South Vietnam and the Philippines have been established for centuries and have flourished. However, they are not popular in either country, and neither Peiping nor Taipei appears able to exercise strong influence on their behalf.

In South Vietnam, where the estimated 830,000 Chinese (6.9 percent of the population) had

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been granted a separate cultural and political status by the French, the government in 1956 launched a vigorous program of forced "Vietnamization," giving locally born Chinese the choice of accepting Vietnamese citizenship, language, and culture, or of being excluded from vital businesses and professions in which they were active.

After two years of resistance, the Chinese bowed to government demands and, outwardly at least, became Vietnamese. They had almost no choice, as little opportunity was provided for them to leave South Vietnam. Despite vague threats to turn to Peiping for assistance when Taiwan's intercession on their behalf proved ineffective, the Chinese of Vietnam, following the government's lead, continue to favor Nationalist China over Peiping.

In the Philippines, where friction involving the local Chinese has continually marred relations with Taipei, the outlook for the Chinese community may be even less promising than in South Vietnam. A growing clamor for social and economic restrictions, like the recent law intended to wrest control of retail trade from Chinese hands and the decision to deport "undesirable" Chinese aliens, appears to preclude any rapid assimilation of the Chinese community. The Chinese village retailer, however, is still considered an excellent marriage prospect among rural Filipinos.

Although a pro-Peiping minority probably exists among the Philippines' 330,000 Chinese (1.5 percent of the population), the community as a whole tends to favor Taiwan, reflecting the government's position, and continues to defend its interests, primarily through informal use of its economic power with influential

Filipino legislators and officials.

Chinese in Indonesia

The Chinese community in Indonesia, some three million or 3.5 percent of the total population, is probably the least stable in Southeast Asia. Granted a special status somewhere between the European and the native in the era of Dutch colonial rule, the Chinese community gained major economic power--and the hearty dislike of Indonesian nationalists. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of the community accepted Indonesian citizenship when Chinese were required to register their citizenship in 1951.

In the last three years, discriminatory measures have borne heavily, not only on alien Chinese who are loyal to Peiping or Taiwan, but also on uncommitted Chinese and Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry. Pro-Nationalist Chinese businesses, organizations, schools, and newspapers were either confiscated or banned in 1958 when the Indonesian Government charged Taipei with assistance to Indonesian rebels. For a period thereafter, pro-Communist influence was unchallenged.

In May 1959, however, the government banned Chinese retailers in rural areas and ordered the resettlement of all Chinese from some rural regions to nearby towns and cities. Peiping's remonstrances have been ineffective, and the Chinese fear that these restrictions are but the forerunner to their expulsion from the country. However, the Chinese Communist Government, through its willingness to accept Chinese repatriates and to provide transportation to the mainland has remained more attractive than the Chinese Nationalist Government to the Chinese of Indonesia.

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POLAND LOSING BRIEF CULTURAL FREEDOM

Poland's intellectual and cultural life since Gomulka came to power in 1956--once regarded as a test of whether freedom of expression could be compatible with Communist rule--is being subjected to ever-increasing repression. While there have been few dramatic moves against intellectuals, the margin of freedom permitted them is shrinking gradually but steadily.

The party seems determined not only to curtail freedoms, but also to direct the talents of the intelligentsia into what it considers the desirable political and ideological channels and to make Poland's cultural life conform more closely to that in the remainder of the bloc. The increased controls are part of First Secretary Gomulka's broader campaign to tighten the party's authority over every aspect of Polish life.

A major factor in the cultural tightening is Gomulka's dislike and distrust of intellectuals generally. He never really favored the freedom enjoyed by Polish writers when he came to power, but his position was not firm enough to enforce his views. Most Polish party leaders look on journalists, writers, and artists as revisionists at heart and have long wanted to bring them under party control.

Since the third plenum of the party central committee in October 1959, the hard-line elements in the party appear to have been in the ascendant. Zenon Kliszko, a close friend and confidant of Gomulka, has urged him to take sterner action against the intellectuals. The "resignation" of Jerzy Morawski from his posts on the party politburo and secretariat apparently resulted from his opposition to greater controls

generally--but more specifically those in the cultural field. Politburo member Edward Ochab, who now is in charge of cultural matters, probably will attempt to impose a more doctrinaire party line.

Education Reforms

Increasingly dissatisfied with the poor political indoctrination provided by Polish universities, the party congress in March 1959 laid down the line that the compulsory courses in philosophy "must be conducted exclusively in the spirit of Marxism." There are practical difficulties in teaching philosophy with a Marxist slant, however, because few professors will admit to such views, and many who are qualified find themselves "too busy" to teach these required courses.

Professor Adam Schaff, leading party ideologist, stated recently that the party is considering reinstating in the universities compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism; these had been dropped following Gomulka's return to power. Such a step, Schaff said, is "indispensable" to the strengthening of the Marxist ideological offensive against the pressures of alien ideologies. He admitted, however, that regime efforts to impose compulsory courses in Marxism by "administrative means" have proved self-defeating.

Polish students are not interested in Communist ideology, and attempts to popularize Marxism would encounter at least indifference and possibly open resistance. There is also a move under way to revise all textbooks and teaching aids in an effort to instill the "proper socialist attitude" in Polish school children.

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Retreat of the Writers

In the long struggle against the reimposition of party controls, Polish intellectuals--especially writers--had given ground only grudgingly until the Writers' Union Congress last December. At the 1958 congress at Wroclaw, for example, the writers put up such a spirited battle against the government's censorship policy that they succeeded in retaining an independent leadership under the respected non-Communist poet Antoni Slonimski. By 1959, however, most of the writers had been cowed.



SLONIMSKI

Party and government leaders speaking at the December congress told the writers that it is not enough for them to refrain from writing in a vein critical of the regime; they must also "make a positive contribution to the building of socialism." All hostility--even by implication--must be eliminated. Deputy Premier Jarosewicz complained that in the past few years Polish literature, hampered by "reactionary and backward political trends," had failed to meet the needs of the times; he called on the writers to be active allies of the party.

Another party spokesman warned that the Writer's Union must again become the ideological stronghold it had been from 1949 to 1956, and that it must give up the purely professional role it has attempted to play since October 1956.

Of the 14 men elected to the governing presidium of the Writers' Union at the December 1959 meeting, six are party members and two or three others have been called "non-card-carrying party members." Only a few of the liberal writers

previously elected to union posts in the period since October 1956 were named to high positions last December. Jaroslaw Iwaskiewicz, a leading nonparty literary figure who bends with the prevailing political winds



IWASZKIEWICZ

was elected president of the union, replacing Slonimski, who consistently opposed party domination of the writers.

Important new members of the Writers' Union presidium include candidate member of the party central committee Jerzy Putrament, another opportunist who jumped on the Gomulka bandwagon after October 1956; central committee member Leon Kruczkowski, a Stalinist die-hard who also heads the party's cultural commission; and central committee member and former education minister Stefan Zolkiewski, who laid down the party line at the congress.

Regime Measures

The regime is using a number of methods to apply pressure: threat of loss of a job; refusal to permit a work to be published; occasional "check-ups" by the police; and various overt and subtle pressures on families. The party has also appointed special commissions to investigate the ideological situation in all areas of cultural life. As a result of these pressures, the intellectuals have become

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more prudent and passive, and less willing to express themselves.

The government has instituted a thorough re-examination of publishing policies, with major emphasis on assuring that all materials published are completely acceptable from the ideological point of view. Widespread rumors of drastic editorial and personnel changes and unclear and inconsistent party directives have caused a great deal of uncertainty about publishing plans for 1960.

A major effect of the increasingly severe control over intellectuals is that novels, stories, articles, and poems can no longer pass censorship if they portray life and conditions as they actually are in Poland today. There is no place for such works of protest as Adam Wazyk's Poem for Adults, Leopold Tyrmand's The Man With the White Eyes, or Marek Hlasko's The Eighth Day of the Week and The Graveyard, a few of the works that once made Polish literature vital and fascinating.

The economic pressures are having their effect, and many writers have turned to noncontroversial subjects such as medieval architecture. Translation of Western books into Polish probably will be reduced, since the party apparently has decided that too much emphasis has been given to pessimistic, avant-garde books -- to the neglect of more optimistic "socialist" works. While the regime can apply its negative controls and prevent the publication of works it does not approve, there is little evidence that it has succeeded in forcing writers to make a "positive contribution to the building of socialism" or to return to producing works of "socialist realism."

The Polish film industry, renowned for its imaginative and

realistic portrayal of contemporary life, has not escaped the heavy hand of censorship. Motion picture producers have been called on the carpet by party functionaries and told that while Polish movies might have won prizes abroad they did so only because the Western judges considered them anti-Communist. Producers were warned that henceforth Polish movies, like Polish literature, would be judged according to whether they aid the party in achieving national goals. Several films almost completed have been halted in production, others have been heavily censored and revised, and a number of scripts have been rejected.

Jazz and avant-garde music are still being played by orchestras both in Poland and on tour abroad without interference from the regime. Nevertheless, such music is under a cloud in Poland, and there is considerable speculation that the regime might decide not to hold the annual autumn festival of contemporary music.

While there is no firm evidence that the regime is making foreign travel more difficult for Polish intellectuals and artists, few of them are seeking permission to travel. There have been some delays in obtaining passports, and many who have received grants for study and travel abroad and others, including Antoni Slonimski, who have been approached by American impresarios about tours to the United States, consider it wise not to push their applications for passports at this time.

Prior to this year, Polish television newscasts were for the most part factual and well balanced, with comparatively unbiased coverage of events in the West through the extensive use of film clips. Since the first of the year, however,

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television newscasts have undergone a change indicating tighter political control of the news and a greater conformity with bloc policies. Not only has there been a significant increase in news and film coverage from bloc countries--especially from the Soviet Union--but there has been a definite trend toward interpreting the news according to the Communist line through careful selection of news items and some slanted editorial commentaries.

Although the United States has not been criticized directly, no opportunity is lost to associate it with NATO, Chancellor Adenauer, and West Germany--the chief targets of Poland's propaganda. The recent newscasts portray the USSR as the leader of the Communist bloc, the protector of Poland's interests, and the leader of the forces seeking peace.

Soviet Pressures

There is considerable debate among Polish intellectuals concerning the role played by the Soviet Union in the cultural tightening. Some believe that Soviet criticism of Polish art, music, literature, and films has been largely responsible for the party's sterner action. Others cite the trend toward liberalization in these fields inside the USSR as indicating

there is no reason for official pressure from the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, Soviet criticism of Polish cultural life has been rather sharp in recent months. Critics in the USSR have reproached the Polish movie makers for "unduly thickening the dark colors" and for failing to maintain the proper proportion when dealing with the struggle between the old and the new in Polish life. The Russians have long been critical of Polish art, which has a freshness and vigor found nowhere else in the bloc, and have strongly implied that it is having a bad influence on art in other "socialist" countries.

The curbs imposed on Poland's cultural and intellectual life so far have been somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent and often have consisted more of threats of dire things to come than specific restrictive measures. While there is little evidence that the regime will be successful in forcing the intelligentsia to cooperate actively in "building socialism," it seems clear that Poland's literature, art, and culture for some time to come will no longer exhibit the freedom, vitality, and imagination that has characterized it since the October 1956 revolt.

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